In 2021, after nearly 18 years of translating the Arabic media, Mideastwire.com’s core editorial team - Nicholas Noe, Mirella Dagher, Zeina Rouheib, Mohamed-Dhia Hammami and Ibrahim Jouhari, launched our Value Checking effort. Mideastwire.com's original purpose has therefore expanded: To reliably translate key articles appearing in the Arabic media but also to regularly provide objective, fact-based Value Checks in Arabic and English for some of the pieces that we think our subscribers, as well as the public at large, will benefit from in furthering their own understanding of the Middle East and beyond. Indeed, as in most other parts of the global media-scape, the Arabic media also suffers from misinformation, a lack of context and poor transparency, especially when allowing readers to easily understand the sources for various claims.

Our Value Checking Mission

December 15, 2021:


"Are the Houthis increasing “coordination” with Al-Qa’idah?"


Lead Fact Checker: Nicholas Noe

Feedback Contact: info@arabmediafactcheck.org

Fact Check Assessment: False

The almost seven-year-long war in Yemen has immiserated much of an already poor country. According to the UN’s World Food Program:

“The current level of hunger in Yemen is unprecedented and is causing severe hardship for millions of people. Despite ongoing humanitarian assistance, 16.2 million Yemenis are food insecure. Pockets of famine-like conditions have returned to Yemen for the first time in two years in Hajjah, Amran and Al Jawf, where nearly 50,000 people are living in famine like conditions. Over 5 million people in Yemen are on the brink of famine as the conflict and economic decline have left families struggling to find enough food to get through the day.”

In many reports across the Arabic and English language media, however, the desperation of the Yemeni people is often given second billing when compared to the regional military dimensions of the conflict, especially when it comes to Iran and Saudi Arabia.


Since both states are widely perceived to be the main backers (and active fighting partners to varying degrees) for different sides in the fighting - the Saudis on the side of UN-recognized “pro-government” forces and the Iranians on the side of the insurgent “Houthi” forces - both also regularly get accused by opposing media of supporting or receiving support from Al-Qa’idah, a violent extremist group sanctioned by the UN that has been active in the country since just after Ossama Bin Ladin founded it in Pakistan the late 1980s.


On December 14, 2021, Mideastwire.com translated a piece by Okaz newspaper that was reported by its correspondent, Ahmed al-Shmeri, from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Al-Shmeri claimed: “Reliable sources in Sana’a [the capital of Yemen now controlled by the Houthis] revealed that coordination has increased between Al-Qa’idah and the Houthi militia lately, adding to Okaz that the coup [authority] gave a number of Al-Qa’idah leaders in Al-Bayda high military ranks, and sealed a deal to ensure their participation in the military operations in Ma’rib and the western coast.”


First and foremost, it is crucial for the reader to know that Okaz is a staunchly pro-Saudi monarchy newspaper with close ties to the ruling family. Accordingly, since the beginning of the war in Yemen, the paper’s reporting, opinion pieces and editorials have invariably reflected the positions of the Saudi Government, especially when it comes to positioning all blame for the resulting violence on the Houthis and, by extension, Iran. At the same time, critical and investigative reporting in the kingdom is severely limited and dangerous, with Reporters Without Borders ranking Saudi Arabia 169th out of 180 countries for freedom of the pres. In one piece on October 5, 2018, an Okaz journalist justified the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi -- allegedly as a result of orders by the Saudi Crown Prince - by claiming he was a terrorist sympathizer whose sectarian goals were designed to destabilize the kingdom.


Although, Al-Shmeri repeatedly refers to unnamed sources (said to be “reliable” but for whom the reader has no other contextual information), his claims about recent increases in Houthi-Al-Qa’idah military operation run counter to the vast majority of past and current reporting and analyses that have long described the continuous, open hostilities between the two groups who are opposed politically, ideologically and religiously, not least because of the extreme Sunni doctrine favored by Al-Qa’idah and the tendency towards aligning with Shi’i doctrine amongst the Houthis.


In fact, just this past summer in one of many notable incidents in the Yemeni governorates of Al Bayda and Shabwah, the international NGO ACLED reported, “increases in political violence last week driven by resumed AQAP [Al-Qa’idah] activity. In Al Bayda, AQAP claims to have ambushed Houthi forces in Mukayras district, representing the first attack claimed by AQAP this month (Twitter @Dr_E_Kendall, 14 June 2021). Of course, as the international NGO Crisis Group put it in September, 2021, the Houthis also take political advantage of such attacks and “regularly accuse the government and Saudis of working alongside Al-Qa’idah, branding rival fighters as either mercenaries or terrorists” for the Kingdom.


While the possibility always exists of prior or even newfound cooperation between Al-Qa’idah and the Houthis - as the original Okaz article claims - its prima facia unlikeliness at the very least warrants deeper reporting, more transparent sourcing and greater consideration to the well-known prior history of conflict between the two sides. Why, for example, is Al-Qa’idah taking public responsibility for attacks on the Houthis whilst supposedly cooperating with the latter?


In the end, sadly, no matter who Al-Qa’idah may be working with or against, the continuation of the devastating war in Yemen very likely means that,



“In a post-war Yemen, any actor discontented with the new order – whether AQAP or some Al-Qa’idah-like entity, one faction or another of Yemen’s elites, or an outside power with a regional agenda, or all of the above – will be able to tap a rich vein of sectarianism among the ex-fighters and use it for their own ends.” [Crisis Group]