In 2021, after nearly 18 years of translating the Arabic media, Mideastwire.com’s core editorial team - Nicholas Noe, Mirella Dagher, Zeina Rouheib, Mohamed-Dhia Hammami and Ibrahim Jouhari, launched our Value Checking effort. Mideastwire.com's original purpose has therefore expanded: To reliably translate key articles appearing in the Arabic media but also to regularly provide objective, fact-based Value Checks in Arabic and English for some of the pieces that we think our subscribers, as well as the public at large, will benefit from in furthering their own understanding of the Middle East and beyond. Indeed, as in most other parts of the global media-scape, the Arabic media also suffers from misinformation, a lack of context and poor transparency, especially when allowing readers to easily understand the sources for various claims.

Our Value Checking Mission

March 30, 2022


Did the UAE end its “direct involvement in the Saudi-led war against the Houthis" before the recent missile attacks?


Lead Fact Checker: Nicholas Noe

Feedback Contact: info@arabmediafactcheck.org

Fact Check Assessment: False

On March 30, 2022, the Washington Post carried a report by Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan headlined, “Ukraine has widened the breach between U.S. and Persian Gulf countries,” which detailed tension and disagreements between the Biden Administration and several Gulf Monarchies, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, “heightened existing strains in the Biden administration’s relationships in the Middle East,” the two journalists wrote, adding, “Nowhere have the bonds been as frayed as with Persian Gulf partners Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Their reluctance to increase oil output as gas prices rise, along with what the Biden administration sees as a less-than-robust condemnation of Moscow, are among the most visible current reasons.”


One of the report’s main assertions is that the UAE is particularly upset at the US for “what the Emiratis consider a tepid US response to Houthi attacks when the first missiles rained down from Yemen on fuel tankers in Abu Dhabi, killing three civilians.” Since the beginning of the year, Houthi insurgent forces which control the Yemeni capital Sana’a as well as much of the north and central parts of the country have repeatedly targeted the UAE with drone and ballistic missile attacks. The Houthi attack on January 17 which the Post report references was the first such assault acknowledged by the UAE inside its borders and claimed by the Houthis since Saudi Arabia initiated a military intervention in Yemen - with the involvement of the UAE - in March 2015 following calls from the president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, for military support. According to, the Post journalists:

“Relatively common against Saudi Arabia, the rare strike against the Emiratis — whose direct involvement in the Saudi-led war against the Houthis ended several years ago — was the beginning of weeks of similar attacks.. In response, the UAE appealed to the United States for more interceptors, more intelligence on Houthi movements, and the US re-designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization.”

But as Gregory Johnsen, a non-resident fellow for the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, quickly noted, “it is not accurate to say that UAE's ‘direct involvement in the Saudi-led war against the Houthis ended several years ago.’ The UAE drew down but didn't withdraw. There are still UAE troops on the ground.”

Johnsen was referring to media reports in the summer of 2019 that said the UAE was “scaling back” its military presence in Yemen. According to one “unnamed senior Emirati official” who spoke with Reuters, “‘It is true that there have been some troop movements ... but it is not a redeployment from Yemen’... [the] official [said], adding that the UAE remains fully committed to the military coalition and ‘will not leave a vacuum’ in Yemen.”


And indeed, since the UAE’s “scaling back” in 2019, direct Emirati involvement in the Saudi-led coalition has continued (they never announced, in any case, a scaling back from the coalition itself), while, more significantly, it has been the main driver behind the so-called Giants Brigade which has proved the most successful in recent battles against the Houthis. As the staunchly pro-Saudi and pro-Emirati columnist Abdullah Bin Bjad Al-Otaibi declared proudly on January 22, 2022 in the Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat:

“The UAE has succeeded in supporting the Giants Brigade and betting on its patriotism, Arabism, and absolute loyalty to Yemen as it trained, armed and planned it. The combat creed of the Giants Brigade was evident and unambiguous as it required neither discussion nor any bargaining, and it was not polluted by the ideology of political Islam and its groups and organizations.”

According to longstanding Gulf analyst, former CIA staffer and now senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Bruce Riedel, the Houthi attacks that had started the previous month were actually precipitated by Houthi frustration over the successes of the Giants Brigade on the battlefield. After the UAE “sent in… the Giants Brigade, mostly composed of southerners, which it finances to drive the Houthis back,” he said, “the Houthis fired missiles at Abu Dhabi in January.”


Of course, while it is not precisely known why the Houthis decided to escalate by directly attacking the UAE earlier this year, the UAE’s direct involvement in fighting against the Houthis, including since its 2019 “scaling back,” is widely acknowledged by media and analysts both generally critical of the UAE’s policy in Yemen as well as by those controlled or supportive of the UAE, leading to our determination that the Post’s claim in this regard is false. [Note to Reader: The Washington Post did not respond to our request for clarification regarding the article and as of April 5, 2022, has not issued a correction.]